Therein lies another rub. The Administration claims that the

Therein lies another rub. The Administration claims that the policy wr.s successful, that if it were not for the uproar raised by a partisan Congress controlled by the opposition, it would have resulted in more hostages coming home. If that policy was so successful, why is it that at the time the deal was made public by a Lebanese magazine, there were more hostages being held than when the effort started?

In the meantime, another long-standing American government policy lay in ruins: that the United States will not negotiate with hostage-takers under any circumstances. For many years, this policy has resulted in no American government officials (other than those seized by a mob in Tehran) being taken hostage. For many years, the only Americans kidnapped overseas were executives of private corporations, whose companies are not covered by the prohibition.

The implication to kidnappers is clear: if you have nothing to gain by a kidnapping, why bother? True, in individual cases, this is a coldhearted policy. To explain to the anguished family of a kidnap victim that no concessions, no ransom, will be paid toward his release, seems callous in the extreme. But, it works.

Conversely, is anyone really surprised that when terrorists realized that they could barter hostages for weapons from the United States, more Americans were taken captive? It seems pretty logical to me.

With Adm. Poindexter’s testimony last week that he did not inform President Reagan of the weapons profit diversion, the central question of Presidental involvement seems to have been answered, and the President exonorated. But, is he really?

Adm. Poindexter testified that he approved the diversion on his own initiative, but that he felt sure the President would have approved if he had known. He kept it secret only to protect the President from political embarrassment, he said. To establish “deniability,” he later said.

The White House issued a statement contradicting Adm. Poindexter’s assertion. The President, it said, would not have approved the policy. To which Adm. Poindexter replied that he stood by his statement. What did you expect, he added. That’s what deniability is all about.

Adm. Poindexter’s explanation only reinforces the central culpability in this case. It is immaterial whether the President actually had knowledge of the actions. Indeed, his memory has been so appallingly absent throughout the entire affair that it’s possible he did know and actually, no kidding, forgot.

But, let’s assume that Adm. Poindexter is