Block · one region of the page, as the scanner read it. It may hold a whole story, part of one, several, or an advertisement; stitching blocks into articles is the next step. Text is supplied OCR.
Page 5 · column 2 of 6 · from the scan, no model involved
Political Analysis
The only strategy that now exists is deja vu - Vietnamization. The notion that the problem is one of “training5, begs the real issue. The real issue is motivation. So long as the US military is the real power calling the shots and the government in place is seen as a dependency, then all who fight for it or support it politically are collaborators in the eyes of the opposition. The Iraqi security forces fight mainly because they need money. They fight unenthusiastically because they know they are branded by the opposition as collaborators and will be even more vulnerable once Americans leave. How would Americas view other Americans who fought for a foreign occupying power that was making their life worse, humiliating them with road blocks and searches and killing civilians every day? Lesson number one, said Robert McNamara in the Fog of War was, “empathize with your enemy.”
Looking at the
numbers
There is a missing link in the public discussion of the insurgency that makes understanding the problem the US faces difficult to grasp. Let’s assume that one third of the 25 million Iraqis want the US to stay to “finish the job” - whatever that is, one third want us out yesterday, and one third has mixed feelings. If one third wants US soldiers to go now, that is roughly 8 million people who blame the US for their woes. Now imagine that each Iraqi whose house has been destroyed, whose children or parents or friends have been killed or maimed by American bombs or bullets, or abused and insulted by American troops has an extended family of 50 relatives. The chances might be 50 percent that at least one of them would want to avenge the crime committed.
98.2%