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entire force across the Rapidan at Germanna and Elly’s Fords. Lee decided to march east and meet Grant’s forces, who were making their way through the Wilderness to the open areas around Spotsylvania Courthouse. Ewell and Hill left die entrenchments along the Rapidan and marched toward the Wilderness.
Lee’s decision to pin the Federals deep in the Wilderness was a risky one. Although the opportunity existed for Longstreet to flank the Federals on the south and provide a devastating blow, he would not be able to reach the Wilderness May 6 by his own calculations.
Until Longstreet arrived, Lee had only five divisions (40,000 soldiers) that would have to occupy 10 divisions of the Army of the Potomac (120,000).
Grant and Meade made several miscalculations. First, they believed Lee would not fight beyond Mine Run, approximately eight miles from their route to the Wilderness.
Second, if Lee did come to the Wilderness, he could not make it in time to catch them.
Operating on this assumption, Brig. Gen. James Wilson’s calvary division was told to protect the Union’s wagons on the western flank, leaving no manpower to adequately patrol the roads toward Lee. By the evening of the May 4, the lead Confederate units had made camp only three miles from Meade’s unsuspecting troops, who’s head officers had elected to camp that night in the Wilderness.
The decision to set up a static camp
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