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tion that became known as the Battle of the Bulge.
The population of Monschau was horrified at the prospect of return of the German army. People came to beg to be taken along if we had to retreat. We did not retreat. American troops in Monschau held their positions against the German onslaught.
Hitler's plan included dropping thousands of paratroopers in the forests along the Belgian border to the west of Monschau. The population helped us round them up. Their commander took refuge with the local high-school principal who called our commanding officer to accept his surrender
Could this kind of experience have been repeated in Iraq? Germans were different from Iraqis, of course, but they, too, had been subjected to years of regimentation and indoctri1 nation hy their Nazi masters.
A steady barrage of Nazi propaganda - including leaflets delivered in mortar shells — was launched against Monschau during the early weeks of American occupation. And the outcome of the struggle was unclear all through the winter of 1944-45.
But since American control provided security, the population saw no advantage in return of the Wehrmacht and the Nazi party.
The initial combat phase in Iraq was brilliant, but we foiled to (dan for an occupation.
Above all, we had too few troops to confiscate weapons, destroy ammunition dumps, register the population, stop looting, control borders - in short, to enforce order and provide Iraqis with a sense of security. These mistakes have compounded everything since.
An important part of what we should have learned in occupied Germany, and later in Japan, seems to have been forgotten. Germans in 1944 saw that American occupation meant order and predictability and the eventual promise of real freedom because, from the start, we exercised tight control and showed a coherent sense of purpose.
In Iraq, we eliminated Saddam Hussein and his henchmen, but we left ourselves helpless in the face of disorder that has developed into near chaos. The challenge is now greater than we originally faced in ridding Iraq erf' Saddam Hussein.
The author served for more than 30 years in many parts of the world in U.S. Government organizations, completed government service as a senior Staff Officer in Zbigniew BrzezinskTs National Security Council, and then spent 20 years as a consultant with the RAND Corporation. He now lives in Rappahannock County.
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